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INTRODUCTION
Basel capital accord was introduced firstly in 1988. It was introduced to ensure the two principle aims: i) to ensure that banks have an adequate level of capital, ii) to create a level playing field in a competitive perspective.
Due to some limitation of Basel-I and II, later in 2010, Basel-III was introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). To maintain the minimum capital requirement and liquidity holding by the banks for recovering the unexpected losses is the main objectives of the Basel-III (Eubanks, 2010) . According to the guideline of Basel III, Banks need to have not only more capital but also better quality of capital (Lee and Hsieh, 2013) . The old accord mainly focused on capital regulation, but the new mechanism consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars: capital requirement, supervisory review process, and market discipline. But, the minimum capital
Asian Economic and Financial Review
is in line with Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) . Some researchers claim that the association between bank capital regulations and risk-taking is affected by the level of bank performance (Moon and Hughes, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1998; Altunbas et al., 2007; Larbi-Siaw and Lawer, 2015) . Rahman et al. (2017) 2000-2014 Bangladesh GMM Capital adequacy ratios have a negative association with bank risk. Bitar et al. (2018) 1999-2013 OECD countries Quantile regressions and PCA Risk-based capital ratios fail to decrease bank risk.
Zheng and MoududUl-Huq (2017) 2000-2014 Bangladesh GMM Capital has a significant negative impact on risk. 2006-2014 Bangladesh 2SLS Higher capital regulations enhance bank stability when it combats with credit risk. Bitar et al. (2016) 1999-2013 MENA OLS Basel capital requirements enhance bank protection against risk. Ashraf et al. (2016) 2005-2012 Pakistan System GMM A stringent risk-based capital requirement reduce bank portfolio risk Baselga-Pascual et al. (2015) 2001-2012 Europe Dynamic Panel Data Model
Capitalization and bank risk are negatively associated. 2005-2013 Bangladesh GMM and unbalanced dynamic panel data
The negative relation between credit risk and capital regulation and the mixed relation between overall risk and capital regulation. 2008-2012 Bangladesh GMM The large bank holds a lower amount of capital and takes a higher level of risk, and there is a reverse relationship between bank capital levels and bank risk-taking. Ghosh (2014) 1996-2011 GCC banks 3SLS There is a positive association between capital and risk. Guidara et al. (2013) 1982-2010 Canada 2SGMM There is no relationship between risk and capital buffers. Lee and Hsieh (2013 ) 1994 Asian banks GMM Bank capital is negatively related to risk. Lee and Chih (2013) 2004-2011 China
DEA, Tobit and OLS Regression
The CBRC regulates the current ratio to reduce the risk of the bank. Zhou (2013) --Static Model Capital regulations minimize bank risk. Klomp and Haan (2012 OECD countries The banking supervision and regulation has strong impact on the risk-taking behavior of high-risk bank, but the impact is not significant for low-risk banks. Jokipii and Milne (2011 ) 1986 USA Panel data model
The adjustment of capital buffer and portfolio risk is positively related. Agoraki et al. (2011) 1998-2005 Europe GMM Requirements of capital reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Liu and Wilson (2010) 2000-2007 Japan 2SGMM and fixed effect regression
Higher capital leads to lower bank credit risks and vice-versa.
1996-2006
Taiwan OLS CAR has a positive impact on banks' risky investment strategies. Ho and Hsu (2010) 1993-2004 USA 3SLS Capital is positively related to risk and profitability Shim (2010) 2003-2006 Japan 2SLS with fixed effects estimation
There is a negative relationship between risk and the level of capital. Deelchand and Padgett (2009 Malaysia OLS Bank capital and risk are positively associated. Ahmad et al. (2008) After the introduction of Basel I in 1988.
G-10 countries
Weakly capitalized quick bank response to capital regulation, while capital regulation did not change the behavior of well-capitalized U.S. banks. Market discipline is the important tool for capital build-up. Roy (2008 Roy ( ) 1998 Roy ( -2003 Asian banks Panel data model Equity capital to the total asset is negatively related to risk. Agusman et al. (2008) 2004-2006
China GMM The higher capital ratio effectively reduces the bank portfolio risk. Zhang et al. (2008) --Seminal model
To reduce risk and implement capital regulations monitoring and supervision is important tool Silva (2007 Silva ( ) 1999 Silva ( -2004 European banks Panel data model
Capital is positively related to risk and profitability. Iannotta et al. (2007) 1992-2000 Europe Seemingly Unrelated Regression
There is a positive association between risk and bank capital.
Altunbas et al.
1991-2006
Developing Countries
GMM & 3SLS
Bank capital ratio reduces portfolio risk. Hussain and Hassan (2005) 
1993-2000
Taiwan Ordinary Least Square (OLS) There is a positive association between capital adequacy ratio and bank risk. Lin et al. (2005) 1995-1999 36 countries banks
Panel data model
Higher regulatory restrictions increase bank risk-taking. González (2005) --Dynamic model
In competitive banking industries, capital regulations are effective in reducing bank risk-taking Repullo (2004) 1991-1996 USA 3SLS Higher credit risk indicates a higher capital ratio. Aggarwal and Jacques (2001 ) 1989 Swiss Bank 3SLS A positive association exists between the changes in bank capital and changes in risk.
Source: The lists prepared by Authors.
The existing literature shows inconclusive results on the relationship between bank capital regulations and performance. Some studies find a positive association between capital regulations and bank performance Jacques and Nigro, 1997; Goddard et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Naceur and Kandil, 2009; Naceur and Omran, 2011; Mbizi, 2012; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013; Lee and Hsieh, 2013; Kofarmata et al., 2016; . Goddard et al. (2013) and Altunbas et al. (2007) find a negative association between capital regulations and bank performance. However, Guidara et al. (2013) find no significant relationship between capital and bank performance. Bitar et al. (2018) 1999-2013 OECD countries Quantile regressions and PCA Risk-based and non-risk based capital ratios improve bank performance. 2000-2015 Bangladesh GMM The higher the bank regulatory capital ratios higher the profitability. Tran et al. (2016) 1996-2013 US Vector autoregressive model
Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Bitar et al. (2016) 1999-2013 MENA OLS Bank capital has Significant positive relation with profitability. Berger and Bouwman (2013) 1984-2010 USA Logit regressions and OLS Capital and profit positively associated in case of the medium and large banking sector. Lee and Hsieh (2013 ) 1994 Asian banks GMM Capital positively impacts on bank profitability. Guidara et al. (2013) 1982-2010 Canada GMM There is no association between capital and profitability.
Mbizi ( There is a positive relationship between Capital and profitability. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) 1993-2000 Taiwan OLS Financial performance and CAR are positively related. Lin et al. (2005) 1992-1998 European banks Dynamic panel model
The capital-to-assets ratio is positively associated with Profitability. Goddard et al. (2004) --Panel OLS regression Higher capital leads to lower performance. Chiuri et al. (2002) 1989-1995 Swiss Banking sector
3SLS
Capital has a positive impact on earnings. Rime (2001 Rime ( ) 1990 Rime ( -1997 Developing and Developed countries
Panel data model There is a positive relationship between lagged equity variable and the profitability of the bank.
Source:
The lists prepared by Authors.
The relationship between Bank Risk-taking and Performance
The literature on the association between bank risk and performance is still in its infancy. The empirical studies have examined the association of bank performance with different types of risks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, operational risk, market risk, and overall risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2007; Brissimis et al., 2008; Fiordelisi et al., 2011) . The bad luck hypothesis suggests that bank risk and performance is negatively associated (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) . Brissimis et al. (2008) argue that bank credit risk has negative impacts on performance, whereas liquidity risk has positive impacts on performance. Lin et al. (2005) have found a significant negative association between insolvency risk and the performance in Taiwan's banking industry. Banks taking a lower level of risk perform better compared to banks with a higher level of risk-taker (Zhang et al., 2013) .
Some studies find a negative association between bank risk and performance in the US banking sector (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) . The non-performing loan ratio' has negative effect on bank performance. Ekinci (2016) 2002-2015 Turkey GARCH model Credit risk has negative impacts on bank profitability. Almekhlafi et al. (2016 Almekhlafi et al. ( ) 1998 Almekhlafi et al. ( -2013 Yemen Quantitative approach
The non-performing loan has a negative impact on performance.
Noman et al. (2015) 2003-2013 Bangladesh System GMM, GLS A robust significant negative association between risk and bank performance. Ly (2015) 2001-2011 EU27 Panel regression
Liquidity risk is negatively associated with bank performance. Uwuigbe et al. (2015) 2007-2011 Nigeria Panel linear regression
The ratio of non-performing loans has a significant negative effect on the performance. Samuel (2015) Nigeria OLS Improper credit risk management reduces the bank profitability. Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2014) 1997-2010 G7 and Switzerland
SFA
There is a strong positive effect of zscore on performance; indicating a negative association between bank risk and performance. Fan and Yijun (2014 ) 2007 -2012 Europe Multiple regressions
Credit risk management has positive effects on the profitability of the commercial bank. Kaaya and Pastory (2013) 2005-2011 Tanzania  Multiple  regressions Higher credit risk lowers the bank performance. Zhang et al. (2013) 2003-2010 BRIC banks SFA and DEA The lower the risk-taking by the bank indicates higher performance. Boahene et al. (2012) 2005-2009 Ghana Fixed and random effects regression Credit risk (non-performing loan rate) has a significant positive relationship with profitability. Arif and Nauman (2012) Credit risk has a significant negative impact on ROA and ROE for the conventional as well as the Islamic banks. Lin et al. (2005) 1993-2000 Taiwan OLS There is a negative relationship between insolvency risk and bank financial performance.
Source:
In contrast, some of the studies have found a positive association between risk and performance which supports the risk-return trade-off theory (Naceur and Omran, 2011; Boahene et al., 2012; Fan and Yijun, 2014; Saeed and Zahid, 2016) . It has been observed that the existing literature shows mixed results on the association between bank risk-taking and performance. the desk and extensive study, the study also uses journals, books, and online sources.
Variables

Main Variables Performance
This study uses the return on average total assets, i.e., the ratio of profit before tax on average total assets as a measure of performance. ROA represents the generation of profits by employing per unit of asset and reflects the capability of the management to utilize the resources for generating profits (Hassan and Bashir, 2003) . ROA is the key ratio for evaluating performance and widely used in the previous literature (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; García-Herrero et al., 2009; Golin and Delhaise, 2013) .
Capital Regulations
Bank capital plays as a safety measure in case of adverse economic development (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) . The prior empirical literature uses two types' capital ratios such as actual capital and regulatory capital ratio. Here, the actual capital ratio indicates the ratio of shareholders equity to total assets; which is widely used in the literature (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; García-Herrero et al., 2009; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011) . The regulatory capital ratio shows the ratio of regulatory capital (Tier-I capital plus Tier-II capital) to risk-weighted assets; which is also known as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Many recent studies use this ratio as a measure of capital . The study uses capital regulations variable as a main variable as well as an independent variable in the risk and performance equation.
Risk-Taking
The study uses two risk variables as a main variable as well as an independent variable in the capital regulations and performance equation. The study uses the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans as a proxy of credit risk; which uses by the other authors (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Barth et al., 2000; Agoraki et al., 2011) . The higher the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans represents higher credit risk (Barth et al., 2004;  3 www.bb.org.bd 4 data.worldbank.org Berger et al., 2005; González, 2005) . The study also uses the natural logarithm of zscore to measure the default risk or financial stability; where zscore is the ratio of the sum of return on assets and the ratio of shareholders equity to total assets over the standard deviation of return on assets. The higher zscore represents higher financial stability with lower risk and vice-versa (Tan, 2016) . The measure has used by the several empirical studies as a measure of risk or stability (Iannotta et al., 2007; Liu and Wilson, 2013; Tan, 2016) .
Bank-Specific Variables
Cost of Intermediation
It is measured by the ratio of net interest income to average total earning assets. In this study, this variable has used in the performance and risk equation. It is expected that the high net interest income increases performance decreases risk. Thus, a positive relationship expected with performance and a negative relationship with bank risk.
Management Efficiency
It is the ratio of total earning assets to total assets. The study applies this ratio to the capital equation. The higher ratio shows the higher the management efficiency. As managers strive to earn more, it will enhance performance and leads to generate capital. However, the most efficient bank can be the least profitable (Casu and Girardone, 2004) . Therefore, a positive or negative impact on management efficiency on capital is expected.
Bank Size
It is measured by taking the natural logarithm of total assets. The study uses this variable in the capital and performance equation. The higher the assets of a bank indicate large size. Large banks take more advantages rather than small banks such as easy access to capital, economies of scale, and opportunities for diversification (Zhang et al., 2008) . Rahman et al. (2017) claim that a large bank may operate its business with the low amount of capital ratios because of easy access to capital. Some studies find a negative association between bank size and capital (Tan and Floros, 2013; Rahman et al., 2017; ). Hence, a negative impact of bank size on capital is expected. Some authors use bank size to observe the impact of it on performance. They claim that a large bank can reduce costs due to economies of scale which in turns leads to higher profit (Bikker and Hu, 2002; Goddard et al., 2004; Iannotta et al., 2007; Mercieca et al., 2007; Elsas et al., 2010) . On the other hand, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) argue that performance initially increases with size but declines in future due to bureaucratic and other reasons. Thus, there is no prior expectation of the bank size and performance relationship.
Leverage
It is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. This variable has been used in the capital, risk, and performance equation. The high ratio of leverage indicates high financial risk. So, a positive relationship expected between leverage and risk . Higher risk may reduce profits, but the risk-return trade-off indicates no risk any return. Hence, high leverage may generate high profit which leads to high capital and vice-versa.
Therefore, no prior expectation of the association between leverage and performance as well as leverage and capital.
Risk-Weighted Assets to Total Assets
It is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets (rwata). It is an important determinant of capital regulations and bank risk-taking. This study includes this variable in the capital and risk equation. A high ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets indicates the higher capital requirement (i.e., lower capital adequacy) which leads to higher risk-taking (Avery and Berger, 1991) . Thus, the study expects a positive association between rwata and bank risk as well as a negative association between rwata and capital regulations.
Labor Efficiency
It is measured as the net profit after tax per employee. The study uses this variable in the performance equation as like as other empirical studies (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Tan, 2016; . The high ratio of labor efficiency indicates not only the efficient management of the bank but also increases the bank's performance. Therefore, the study expects a positive association between labor efficiency and bank performance.
Financial Intermediation
It is the ratio of total loans to total deposits. The study includes this variable in the capital equation. The ratio shows the capabilities of the bank to convert its deposits into higher earning loans (Majumder and Rahman, 2016) .
It also measures liquidity (Naceur and Kandil, 2009 ) where a high ratio indicates low liquidity. The high ratio of financial intermediation indicates high profits which leads to high capital. Hence, the study expects a positive association between financial intermediation and bank risk-taking.
Implicit Cost
It is the ratio of non-interest expenses to non-interest income. This variable is included in the performance equation. The high ratio indicates a low profit (Naceur and Kandil, 2009 ). Thus, the study expects a negative association between implicit cost and bank performance.
Cost Inefficiency
The study uses the cost to income ratio as a measure of cost inefficiency. This variable is included in the performance and risk equation. Higher the ratio lowers the efficiency. The variable has been widely used in the existing literature (Kosmidou, 2008; García-Herrero et al., 2009; Liu and Wilson, 2010; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Baselga-Pascual et al., 2015) . Athanasoglou et al. (2008) claim that the cost-efficient bank increases bank performances. This evidence is supported by Jiang et al. (2003) and Bourke (1989) . However, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) find a positive impact of cost inefficiency on profitability. Thus, there is no prior expectation of the relationship between cost inefficiency and performance.
Cost inefficiency is a source of bank risk (Baselga-Pascual et al., 2015) . Cost inefficiency is positively related to bank risk (Louzis et al., 2012) . The study expects a positive relationship between cost inefficiency and bank risk.
Income Diversification
It is the ratio of non-interest income to total income. This variable is included in the performance equation. argue that a bank can generate more income when it engaged with diversified businesses. (Jiang et al., 2003) find positive impacts of income diversification on performance. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Gischer and Juttner (2001) suggest a negative association between income diversification and performance. This result has been explained by the fact that there is a strong competition for generating freeincome compared to traditional interest generation activity. Therefore, there is no prior expectation of the relationship between income diversification and performance.
Industry-Specific Variables
Industry Concentration
The study uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the degree of market concentration through the analysis of market power in the capital and risk equation. HHI is the most widely used measures of concentration in the existing literature. HHI is the sum of the squares of all banks market shares regarding banks total assets within a country (Bikker and Haaf, 2002) . The greater the market concentration indicates, the lower competition within the banks and vice-versa . The greater concentrated market leads to greater market power which in turns increases profits and capital to take excessive risks (Park and Peristiani, 2007) . Boyd and Nicolo (2005) claim that the monopolistic banks may charge high amount of lending interests rates to their clients. As a result, the clients may involve in the riskier projects to meet their high financing costs. Therefore, this situation creates more loan defaulters, which increases bank risk and decreases capital. Hence, the empirical literature shows the positive or negative impact of industry concentration on bank capital and risk.
Bank-Level Lending Rate
It measures the ratio of interest income to total loan and advances. This ratio is included in the capital and risk equation. The high ratio indicates higher earnings and lowers the bank risk. Thus, the study expects a positive relationship between the lending rate and capital, whereas a negative association expects between lending rate and bank risk.
Macroeconomic Variables Economic Growth
It indicates an annual GDP growth rate (%). The study uses this variable in the performance equation. Some researchers find a positive association between GDP growth rate and performance (Bikker and Hu, 2002; Athanasoglou et al., 2008) . However, Majumder and Uddin (2017) and finds a negative association between GDP growth and performance. Thus, the study has no prior expectation of the association between economic growth and performance.
Inflation
It indicates annual rate inflation (GDP deflator). The study has been included this variable in the risk equation.
The higher the rate of inflation deteriorates bank risks (Baboucek and Jancar, 2005) . On the other hand, Hussain and Hassan (2005) find a positive association between inflation and bank risk. Thus, the study expects a positive or negative association between inflation and bank risk-taking.
Empirical Methodology and Models
This study applies the dynamic model and two-step system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000) . The study uses system GMM because of the following reasons. Firstly, It is an appropriate measure for addressing potential endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity problem (Baltagi, 2001; Doytch and Uctum, 2011) . Secondly, Bond (2002) argues that the system GMM technique addresses the unit root property issues and gives more precise results as compared to difference GMM. Finally, another important reason for using GMM rather than ordinary least squares (OLS), the later one provides biased results in case of dynamic model (Nickell, 1981) . The study also uses two-stage least squares regression for checking the robustness of the results estimated by GMM.
The present study seeks to investigate the simultaneous relationship between capital regulations and bank risktaking in the banking sector of Bangladesh. The study also seeks to find out the impact of capital regulations and risk-taking on bank performance. The investigation is using an empirical model which includes measures of capital regulations, risk-taking, and bank performance as dependent variables plus some independent variables. The summary of the variables used in the study is shown in Table 3 .1.
The empirical model specification is as follows:
Where i indicate to year and t indicates to individual bank. represents capital regulations, risk-taking, and performance indicators for the specific bank at a specific year. Yij,t− 1 is the one period lagged capital regulations, risk-taking, and performance indicators. C is a constant term, δ represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium, Xit with superscripts k, l and m represent bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables respectively.
vit and uit indicate the unobserved bank-specific effect and idiosyncratic error respectively. βk, βl, and βm represents the coefficients to be estimated.
The study uses two measures of capital regulations such as the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (car) and the ratio of shareholder's equity to total assets (ear). The risk-taking variable represents by two measures such as the ratio of non-performing loan to total loans (npltl) and the natural logarithm of zscore (lnzscore); where zscore = (roa+ear)/standard deviation of roa. The bank performance is measured by return on average total assets, i.e. the ratio of profit before tax to average total assets.
To measure the impacts of bank risk-taking on capital regulations, the study uses the following empirical models:
Model 1 with the capital regulations (car) and bank risk-taking (npltl):
Model 2 with the capital regulations (car) and bank risk-taking (lnzscore):
Model 3 with the capital regulations (ear) and bank risk-taking (npltl):
Model 4 with the capital regulations (ear) and bank risk-taking (lnzscore):
The above models 1 to 4 includes bank-specific variables such as return on average total assets (roa), management efficiency (meff), bank size (bsize), leverage (lvr), risk-weighted assets to total assets (rwata), financial intermediation (finim); Industry concentration (hhiic) and bank-level lending rate (bllr) includes as industry-specific variable; the macroeconomic variables includes economic growth (aggr) and inflation (infr).
To measure the impacts of capital regulations on bank risk-taking, the study uses the following empirical models:
Model 1 with the bank risk-taking (npltl) and capital regulations (car):
Model 2 with the bank risk-taking (npltl) and capital regulations (ear):
-------- (7) Model 3 with the bank risk-taking (lnzscore) and capital regulations (car):
Model 4 with the bank risk-taking (lnzscore) and capital regulations (ear):
-----(9) The above models 1 to 4 includes bank-specific variables such as return on average total assets (roa), cost of intermediation (nim), leverage (lvr), risk-weighted assets to total assets (rwata), cost inefficiency (cineff); Industry concentration (hhiic) and bank-level lending rate (bllr) includes as industry-specific variable; and inflation (infr) includes as the macroeconomic variable.
To measure the impact of capital regulations and risk-taking on bank performance, the study uses the following empirical models:
Model 1 with the capital regulations (car) and risk-taking (npltl) on the effect of bank performance (roa):
Model 2 with the capital regulations (car) and risk-taking (lnzscore) on the effect of bank performance (roa):
-------- (11) Model 3 with the capital regulations (ear) and risk-taking (npltl) on the effect of bank performance (roa):
Model 4 with the capital regulations (ear) and risk-taking (lnzscore) on the effect of bank performance (roa):
------- (13) The above models 1 to 4 includes bank-specific variables such as cost of intermediation (nim), bank size (bsize), leverage (lvr), labor efficiency (leff), implicit cost (impc), cost inefficiency (cineff), income diversification (indiv); and economic growth (aggr) includes as the macroeconomic variable.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of all the study variables are presented in Table 4 .1. To remove the influence of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 5% level. The average performance (roa) of the Bangladeshi banks is 2.5% whereas the minimum value is 0.70%, reflecting that some banks are performing very poor. As per Basel-III, Bangladeshi banks have to maintain a minimum capital requirement at 10% of risk-weighted assets. The average value of capital regulations (car) is 11.4%, indicating that it is higher than the required minimum capital as per Basel-III accord. The minimum value of capital regulations (car) 8.4% represents that some banks have maintained below the minimum capital requirements. The average value of other measures of capital regulations (ear), i.e., shareholder's equity to total assets ratio is 7.5%, whereas the minimum value 4.2% indicates that some bank maintains with low capital. The mean value of non-performing loans to total loans (npltl) is 5.20%, whereas the maximum value is 17.5% reflecting that some bank has a higher amount of non-performing loans. The risk-taking measures lnzscore indicates high financial stability (low risk) when the ratio is high and vice-versa.
Here, the standard deviation of 0.40 indicates a wide deviation of this variable.
Diagnostic Tests
The study applies the Barako and Tower (2007) suggest that multicollinearity is a serious problem when the correlation value of the two independent variables are above 0.80. Thus, the multicollinearity problem does not appear in this study.
Correlation Analysis
© 2018 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. Notes: Total number of observations 419; ***Correlation is significant at 1% level (2-tailed); **Correlation is significant at 5% level (2-tailed); *Correlation is significant at 10% level (2-tailed); All variables are winsorized at the 5% level.
Regression Analysis
This section derives the regression results of the baseline models after taking several diagnostics tests. All models represent the significant positive coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (cart-1 & eart-1), which confirms the degree of persistence exists in all models and the dynamic character for specifying the models.
The Impacts of Bank Risk-Taking on Capital Regulations
The study finds a significant negative relationship between credit risks (npltl) and capital ratios ( The study further reports that industry concentration (hhiic) is highly significant and positively associated with capital regulations (car & ear), indicating that lower competition due to highly concentrated markets leads to hold more capital to obtain more profits. This evidence is consistent with Rahman et al. (2017) and Tan and Floros (2013) . (2) indicates there is autocorrelation exists in the first-order but not in the second-order. 4 The study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. (2001); Blum (1999) and Shrieves and Dahl (1992) .
The Impacts of Capital Regulations on Bank Risk-Taking
Turning to other explanatory variables, the coefficient of bank performance (roa) is significant and negative, suggesting that there is a negative impact of bank performance (roa) on risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore). This evidence is in line with .
Cost of intermediation (nim) is found to be significantly and negatively related to bank risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore) in model 1 & 2, indicating the higher the generating of net interest income lower the bank risks; which is consistent with the finding of Rahman et al. (2017) .
The study finds that leverage (lvr) has a significant and positive impact on bank risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore), indicating that the higher the liabilities higher the risk-taking; which supports the study of Rahman et al. (2017) .
Concerning the impact of risk-weighted assets to total assets (rwata), it is positively and significantly related to risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore), showing that the higher the risk-weighted assets, the higher the bank risk-taking;
which is consistent with the study of Rahman et al. (2017) .
Cost inefficiency (cineff) has significant positive impacts on risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore). The results suggest that the higher the cost of a bank generates higher risks; this evidence is in line with Baselga-Pascual et al. (2015) .
Bank-level lending rate (bllr) is found to be negatively and significantly associated to risk-taking (npltl & lnzscore) of Bangladeshi commercial banks, indicating a higher amount of loans generate more interest income which leads to lower the bank risk; the results supported by the study of Geng et al. (2016) .
The study noticed that industry concentration (hhiic) Note: The estimation technique is a two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators. The dependent variable is bank risk-taking as measured by npltl and lnzscore. Capital regulations are considered as endogeneous variable. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 1 Test of over-identifying restrictions (Ho: over-identifying restrictions are valid). The tests accept the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid. 2 Arellano-Bond test for the first-order autocorrelation (Ho: no autocorrelation) . 3 Arellano-Bond test for the second-order autocorrelation (Ho: no autocorrelation) . The tests results of AR(1) and AR (2) indicates there is autocorrelation exists in the first-order but not in the second-order. 4 The study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. (2013) and Bougatef and Mgadmi (2016) . (2015); Zhang et al. (2013) and Lin et al. (2005) but inconsistent with the findings of Guidara et al. (2013) and Naceur and Omran (2011) .
The Impact of Capital Regulations and Risk-Taking on Bank Performance
Turning to other explanatory variables, the coefficient of the cost of intermediation (nim) is significant and positive, suggesting that there is a positive impact of the cost of intermediation (nim) on bank performance (roa).
The higher interest income generates higher profits for the banks. This evidence is in line with .
Leverage (lvr) is found to be significantly and negatively related to bank performance (roa) in all models, indicating the higher the liabilities lower the bank performance. The findings are consistent with Aysen (2013) .
The study finds that labor efficiency (leff) has a significant and positive impact on bank performance (roa), indicating that the more efficient of a human resource leads to high performance; which supports the study of Tan (2016).
Concerning the impact of implicit cost (impc), it is negatively and significantly related to performance (roa) in model 1 & 3, showing that the higher the non-interest expenses lower the bank performance; which is consistent with the study of .
Cost inefficiency (cineff) has a significant negative impact on bank performance (roa). The results suggest that the higher the cost of a bank deteriorates its performance; this evidence is in line with .
Income diversification (indiv) is found to be positively and significantly associated to performance (roa) of Bangladeshi commercial banks in model 1 & 3, indicating that higher amount of non-interest income leads to higher performance as a diversified income; the results supported by the study of Jiang et al. (2003) .
The study noticed that bank size (bsize) is negatively and significantly impact on bank performance (roa) showing the higher the assets of a bank lower the performance. The reason is that smaller banks are easier to manage than large banks which leads to high performance as compared to large banks (Tan, 2016) . This result is in line with Tan (2016) and Majumder and Uddin (2017) .
The study further reports that economic growth (aggr) is significantly and positively associated with bank performance indicating that higher the GDP growth in Bangladesh higher the performance. The reason is that the demand for loans increases during the economic boom period, which in turns leads to increases in bank performance. The evidence is consistent with Tan (2016) . (1) 
Note:
The estimation technique is a two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators. The dependent variable is bank performance measured by roa. Capital regulations and bank risk-taking are considered as endogeneous variables. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 1 Test of over-identifying restrictions (Ho: over-identifying restrictions are valid) . The tests accept the null hypothesis that over-identifying restrictions are valid. 2 Arellano-Bond test for the first-order autocorrelation (Ho: no autocorrelation) . 3 Arellano-Bond test for the second-order autocorrelation (Ho: no autocorrelation) . The tests results of AR(1) and AR(2) indicates there is autocorrelation exists in the first-order but not in the second-order. 4 The study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level.
Robustness Check
To examine the robustness of the regression results, the study has introduced a two-stage least square regression instead of GMM in Table 4 Hence, the study results show the consistent estimation in spite of switching method. In summary, the results of this study confirm that as bank risk-taking increases, capital decreases; the capital regulations impact on risk-taking negatively; and capital has a significant positive impact on performance, whereas risk has significant negative impact on performance. Overall, the findings will be beneficial for the policy maker and future researcher. Serial correlation Test (Breusch-Godfrey LM) 1 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000
The Impacts of Bank Risk-taking on Capital Regulations
Heteroscedasticity Test (White) 1 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000
Fixed/random effect test (Hausman) 2 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 1.000 P = 1.000
Note: The estimation technique is Two-stage least squares regression. The dependent variable is capital regulations measured by car and ear. Bank risk-taking is considered as endogeneous variable. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 1 The study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. 2 The study results reject the null hypothesis that there exists a random effect among the study variables except model 3 & 4. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. P = 0.000 P = 0.001 P = 0.002 P = 0.0 0 Serial correlation Test (Breusch-Godfrey LM) 1 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0. 00 P = 0.000
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Fixed/random effect test (Hausman) 2 P = 1.000 P = 1.000 P = 1.000 P = 0.000
Note:
The estimation technique is Two-stage least squares regression. The dependent variable is bank risk-taking as measured by npltl and lnzscore. Capital regulations are considered as endogeneous variable. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 1 The study rejects the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. 2 The study results reject the null hypothesis that there exists a random effect among the study variables except the model 1, 2 & 3. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level. P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 Heteroscedast icity Test (White) 1 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 Fixed/rando m effect test (Hausman) 2 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000 P = 0.000
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The estimation technique is Two-stage least squares regression. The dependent variable is bank performance measured by roa. Capital regulations and bank risk-taking are considered as endogeneous variables. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 1 The study results reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity in all models. 2 The study results reject the null hypothesis that there exists a random effect among the study variables. All variables are winsorized at the 5% level.
CONCLUSIONS
Summary
This paper aims to examine the simultaneous association between capital regulations and bank risk-taking and the impact of capital regulations and bank risk-taking on performance in the banking sector of Bangladesh. The study checks the robustness of the findings by using different measures of risk-taking and capital regulations. To be more specific, the study uses two measures of capital regulations such as capital adequacy ratio, i.e., the ratio of riskweighted assets to total assets and the ratio of shareholder's equity to total assets. There are two measures of risktaking variables have been included in this study such as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans and the natural logarithm of zscore. Bank performance is measured by the ratio of profit before tax as a fraction of average total assets.
The study further uses some bank specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. In the capital equation, to measure the impacts of bank risk-taking on capital regulations, the study uses some control variables such as performance, management efficiency, bank size, leverage, risk-weighted assets to total assets, financial intermediation, bank-level lending rate, and industry concentration.
In the risk-taking equation, to measure the impacts of bank capital regulations on risk-taking, the study uses some control variables such as performance, cost of intermediation, leverage, risk-weighted assets to total assets, cost inefficiency, bank-level lending rate, industry concentration, and inflation.
In the performance equation, to measure the impact of capital regulations and risk-taking on bank performance, the study uses the control variables such as the cost of intermediation, leverage, labor efficiency, implicit cost, cost inefficiency, income diversification, bank size and economic growth. With regards to the econometric model estimation, the study applies a dynamic panel model and a two-step system GMM estimator. The study further applies two-stage least squares regression for checking the robustness of the findings.
Using an unbalanced panel data set of 30 Bangladeshi commercial banks during the period 2002-2016, the study finds a bi-directional negative relationship between capital regulations and bank risk-raking. The study further investigates that capital regulations are significantly and positively impacts on bank performance, whereas risk-taking impacts negatively on the bank performance.
Among the control variables have been used in the capital equation; performance, management efficiency, financial intermediation, bank-level lending rate, and industry concentration indicates positive impacts on capital regulations. In contrast, bank size, leverage, and risk-weighted assets to total assets indicate a negative association with capital regulations.
Concerning the control variables have been used in the risk-taking equation; leverage, risk-weighted assets to total assets, cost inefficiency, and industry concentration are positively impacted on risk-taking; while bank performance, cost of intermediation, bank-level lending rate, and inflation have a negative impact on risk-taking.
The control variables have been used in the performance equation show that cost of intermediation, labor efficiency; income diversification and economic growth are positively associated with bank performance. However, leverage, implicit cost, cost inefficiency, and bank size are negatively related to bank performance.
Finally, the robust results using the two-stage least square regression support the same results, and the same sign of co-efficient has been estimated by the GMM estimator as like as baseline models of this study.
Suggestions and Implications
Due affected capital and negatively on risks. So, the appropriate policies should be taken so that the lending project will be a profitable one and generate more interest income. The higher cost of intermediation reduces bank risk and increases performance. So, the bank should handle the deposits in such a way so that earnings from loan greater than the cost of deposit. The study results show that leverage is negatively affected by the capital and performance, whereas positively impact on risk. The bank should minimize liabilities and have to aware of the contingent events liabilities. The asset portion of the banks should include risky assets as minimum as possible because risk-weighted assets reduce capital and increase bank risk. The bank should invest other diversified sources of income besides interest income as it increases performance. The non-interest expenses should be kept as minimum as possible because higher the implicit cost lower the bank performance. Finally, Government should take relevant fiscal and monetary policies for the Bangladeshi banking industry to control inflation and boost up the GDP, i.e., economic growth.
Avenues for Future Research
Overall, the study results are significant for the policy-making of the banking industry and the development of the financial stability in Bangladesh. The future researchers may take advantages of the limitations of this study in various ways. Firstly, future researchers may take more samples and can compare within the industry or outside the industry with other country's banks. For example, a comparison can be made between private banks and public banks, or conventional banks and Islamic banks, or domestic banks and foreign banks, etc. Secondly, in future, large samples with the recent study period may be taken into consideration. Thirdly, the study considers capital regulations, risk-taking, and performance as main variables. But, the further researcher may add other variables like corporate governance, corporate social responsibility variables with different alternative measures. Fourthly, this study uses GMM and TSLS with E-views and Stata software. In future, another econometric model like structural equation modeling (SEM), mediation effect modeling, and moderator effect modeling with the updated software can be used. Finally, the study expects that this study results will add value to the existing literature and will be significant for the future researcher and policymaker.
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